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ABSTRACT: Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather
diﬀerent from traditional approaches appealing to standards of propositional logic.
Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to
the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e
contrario seem to disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation
appears to be borne by often implicit general principles and an appeal to the system of the
law as a whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best seen
as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal
argument.
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1. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS PUT TO TWO SPECIFIC TESTS, WITH POSSIBLY
GENERAL OUTCOMES
‘. . .Jurists’ own theories about the character of the problems and the
methods of their science have comparatively little value.’ (Alchourro´n
and Bulygin, 1971, p. 66) There may be some seduction to deduce
from this well-known bon mot the contention that a non-jurist ap-
proach to legal reasoning like pragma-dialectics may lead to more
fruitful results (although more than a few prominent pragma-dialecti-
cians are legal scholars as well). However, such an inference would
come down to an argument e contrario, traditionally a suspicious piece
of reasoning, not just in the law.
Recently, pragma-dialectics has been appealed to in order to clar-
ify such suspicious e contrario arguments. In a noteworthy study,
Jansen (2003a) let loose the formidable apparatus of pragma-dialec-
tics in order to analyse and clarify diﬀerent kinds of more or less ex-
plicit e contrario arguments in the law. Kloosterhuis (2002) did the
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same with e contrario’s supposed counterpart in legal reasoning, the
argument from analogy.
Apart from many interesting issues concerning speciﬁc analyses,
more general questions concerning pragma-dialectics prop up here.
Some of them are well-known, like the supposed incompatibility of a
consensus oriented analysis of reasoning and argument, as offered by
pragma-dialectics, with ‘authoritative’ argument in legal procedure and
legal administration, based as both seem to be on ofﬁcial authority
against any dissent if need to it rises.
Other problems may be less amply discussed, but may be all the
more interesting. For example: how does pragma-dialectics relate to
monotonic logical analysis of legal argumentation? Such analysis may
solve more than a few problems of e contrario and analogy. What may
be left for pragma-dialectics, then? This relates to possible problems of
pragma-dialectics concerning starting-points of analysis in arguments
‘as presented’, while even a (propositional) ‘baby-logic’ approach to
analogy and e contrario may lead to the conclusion that such argu-
ments are no autonomous arguments at all and are comprehensible in
wider contexts only, contexts in fact bearing the brunt of argumenta-
tion.
So let’s see whether the worthwhile enterprise of pragma-dialectics
may survive Occam’s razor (analogy again), when it comes to analysis
of legal argumentation by analogy and e contrario. Which of course is
not to imply that pragma-dialectics is an unimportant tool in legal dis-
cussion in a wider sense.
2. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND LOGIC
Though pragma-dialectics is probably too well-known by now in argu-
mentation theory to warrant much further explanation here, still some-
thing may be said on its relationships to elementary propositional
logic.
First and foremost, there may be no conﬂict between pragma-dia-
lectics and logic at all, as they address categorically different issues.
Pragma-dialectics is dealing with speech acts, whereas logic is about
propositions (propositional variables). Pragma-dialectics intends to
state rules governing permissible moves in discussion, propositional lo-
gic may be expressed as a set of inference rules, governing relation-
ships between premises and conclusions. Pragma-dialectics, on the
other hand, is a speciﬁc theory of action, is the real ministry of argu-
mentatively unsilly walks.
Next, though pragma-dialectics aims at normative reconstruction by
dialectical transformation, it still takes discourse ‘as it is’ for granted.
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No doubt this is deeply related to its practical applicability for partici-
pants in real-life discussion. Logical analysis on the other hand may
lead to rational reconstruction of argumentation to extents seemingly
totally unrelated to real-life discussion. (This contrast may seem con-
fusing, but will come to light in the ensuing analogy and e contrario
discussion.)
This difference is related to propositional logic belonging to con-
texts of justiﬁcation only. Logic is no description or even prescription
of processes of thought and discussion, but a yardstick of validity in
argument. Somebody may suddenly see the light in a difﬁcult problem
of science or even of law. Whether there was real light after all is to be
determined by logically valid argumentation from acceptable premiss-
es. Pragma-dialectics occupies much more complex and interesting
positions here, by serving both as a critical guide for discussion and as
an evaluation tool for argumentation.
Next, pragma-dialectics is not just fully compatible with proposi-
tional logic, it presupposes such logic, both in its own consistent and
coherent formulation and in appealing to propositional logic, for
example in requesting consistency in complex standpoints in debate.
Still some possible competition between pragma-dialectics and good
old simple propositional logic may be left. Such simple logic may
explicitly ﬁgure in analysis and evaluation of arguments and conclu-
sions, just as pragma-dialectics intends to. Indeed, recent and impres-
sively extensive pragma-dialectical analyses of analogy and e contrario
argument in law may serve to show the strengths and weaknesses of
such applications of pragma-dialectics in comparison with attempts to
simply logically analyse analogy and e contrario.
3. ANALOGY AND E CONTRARIO IN PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Kloosterhuis deﬁnes analogy as follows (2002, p. 78, see also Kloos-
terhuis, 2000, for a slightly earlier and much shorter explanation in
English):
Legal argumentation by analogy is a speech act in which a judge applies an argu-
mentation scheme based on a comparison relationship, in an attempt to justify a
practical interpretation of a legal rule in a critical discussion, against real or sup-
posed antagonists.
Kloosterhuis next criticises traditional analyses of analogy for three
reasons: they offer no adequate characterisation, no adequate method
of analysis and no criteria for judging argumentation. Against this, he
starts from the idea that analogy is ‘a speech act through which a
judge reaches a practical (i.e. case-oriented) interpretation of a legal
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rule’, in defence of an analogy standpoint vis-a`-vis implicit or explicit
antagonists (socialising argument, as it is called in pragma-dialectics).
So what are successful performances of analogy speech acts, then?
Kloosterhuis distinguishes between ﬁrst and second order arguments.
First order argument is rule application, second order argument is
argumentation on rule application. Such second order argument may
be linguistic, systematic or teleological-evaluative, so he contends,
leading to ﬁrst order argumentation: analogous application of a given
legal rule. It is really important to notice here that Kloosterhuis takes
a main role of the analogon by itself for granted, in his pragma-dialec-
tical analysis of analogy (2002, p. 145 and elsewhere).
Kloosterhuis goes on to make many more important distinctions
(important at least from a ‘phenomenological point of view’). Thus he
interestingly distinguishes between analogia legis, analogia juris and
analogy from hypothetical cases (2002, pp. 134 ﬀ.) and between singu-
lar (related to a single rule) v. generic analogy (related to more than
one rule) (2002, pp. 159 ﬀ.). Also, distinctions are made between anal-
ogous application of given rules (2002, pp. 145 ﬀ.) v. ‘constructive rule
decision in order to ﬁll legal gaps’ (2002, pp. 172 ﬀ.), and between
interpretation problems, comparison of norms or cases and qualiﬁca-
tion problems (2002, pp. 204 ﬀ.)
It comes as no surprise, then, that Kloosterhuis concludes by quali-
fying analogy as an ‘overworked concept’. However interesting and
important his manifold of distinctions may be, it altogether leaves the
impression that analogy may even be a will-o’-the-wisp with which not
even pragma-dialectics may come to grips.
The other main subject here, argument e contrario, is deﬁned by
Jansen (2003b) as ‘the argument that a certain legal rule must not be
applied analogically’. Next she distinguishes between two main types: e
contrario as an argument leading to non-applicability of a legal rule or
e contrario as ‘inversion’ of a legal rule. The ‘modern’ non-applicabil-
ity version is said to lead to no special problems of logic, while the
‘classic’ inversion version is held to come down to ‘reasoning from
contrasts’. Modern e contrario reasoning is ‘maximally defended by co-
ordinatively compound argumentation, in which the ﬁrst argument
states that the legal rule is not literally applicable to the facts at hand
and the second argument that the legal rule must not be applied ana-
logically to those facts.’ Classic e contrario, on the other hand, rests on
the ‘reversed legal rule’ as the foundation for a conclusion about a le-
gal consequence. On another level of argumentation, such a ‘reversed
legal rule’ can be applied analogically, a fortiori and in a reductive
way, just like a ‘normal’ legal rule (Jansen, 2003a, p. 214).
Again, as with Kloosterhuis, this approach to e contrario is ex-
tremely interesting, if only for its seemingly unequalled attention to
‘phenomenological’ detail. True to the realities of legal argumentation
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through pragma-dialectics? Or may it be that more than a few ramiﬁ-
cations of analogy and e contrario have face-value only and may dis-
appear in the light of less charitable and more rigorously logical
analysis? Or even that analogy and e contrario as sensible concepts
and conceptions in themselves may be done away with?
4. ANALOGY AND E CONTRARIO (PROBLEMS) KILLED OFF BY (BABY)
LOGIC, OR: BACK TO LEGAL CONTENT
Noteworthy about these analyses of analogy and e contrario indeed is
their starting point in the unquestioned presumption that there is some-
thing like legal analogy, just as it is taken for granted that there is
something like e contrario. Here it will be contended that in so far as
concepts and realities of analogy and e contrario may be saved at all,
they belong to the realm of heuristics and rhetoric, and have little if
anything to do with reasoning and argument in contexts of justiﬁcation.
Two examples of analogy may serve to clarify this. First, the
famous late 19th century Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. case
paradigmatically serves to show what matters in legal reasoning by
analogy (see Golding, 1984, pp. 46 ﬀ., for a description of the case
and an analysis of analogy rather diﬀerent from though not necessar-
ily at odds with the analysis oﬀered here). Waking up in the morning,
a man travelling on a river steam boat found money missing from his
cabin. He sued the steamboat company for damages. Though there
was no precedent, the court still ordered the company to pay, because
innkeepers had such liability by precedent and because ‘steamboat cir-
cumstances’ were found to be suﬃciently like ‘inn circumstances’,
regarding the legal issue at hand.
What matters here is the underlying principle, and nothing else. If
there is a general duty or obligation of care on parties offering night
accommodation, then both inn-keepers and steamboat companies are
under such a duty or obligation. But of course there is no logical rela-
tionship at all between the original analogon (the inn precedent) and
the general principle of care. Things are the other way round: if the
general principle holds, than there are inn liability implications, and
steamboat company implications as well. But the inn liability rule may
also be derived from the (patently implausible) rule that innkeepers are
liable for anything happening to their guests, and from many more
patently implausible ‘principles’ of course, like that everybody accom-
modating guests is fully liable for everything happening to such guests,
etc. If on the other hand no general principle of care as stated above
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is taken to hold, then a duty of care for innkeepers must be a special
case, or an antiquated precedent.
To put things in terms of simple propositional logic (‘p’ is the
underlying principle, ‘q’ is the original analogon):
p!q
q
____
p
is abduction at best (there may indeed be many more grounds for q,
see on this Kaptein, 1999). All and any backing for p to be derived
from this is the compatibility of p with q, in the sense of q being one
of many implications of p. But again q may be an implication of so
many more principles, thus having little if any importance in backing
the relevant principle by itself. Or: the original analogon plays no
more than a marginal role in the justiﬁcation of the ‘analogously de-
rived new rule’ at best. The new rule, e.g. a steamboat liability rule,
wholly relies on the underlying principle and its further backing. The
principle indeed needs to be more adequately defended, by appeal to
its ‘ﬁt’ with the body of existing law, but also by appeal to its ‘ﬁt’ with
background moral convictions, with notions of reasonableness and
equity and so on, if the following argumentation is to plausibly lead to
r, the ‘new’ analogous rule:
p!r
p
____
r
Thus the whole weight of so-called argument from analogy is on
underlying principle(s) and not on the original analogon at all. Then
the original analogon is no more than a suitable starting-point from a
purely heuristic point of view, or a rhetoric prop probably convincing
audiences with a penchant to sticking to black letter law (explicitly
containing the original analogon) and thus prone to shunning ‘vague
principles’ not to be found explicitly in print (see later on pia fraus as
well).
Here it will go without much further saying that at least from a log-
ical point of view there are no relevant differences between analogia
legis, analogia juris, analogy from precedent etc. What matters in all
superﬁcially diﬀerent kinds of analogy is again the underlying principle
(see Kaptein, 1995, with further references).
One more example may serve to further clarify the redundancy of
the analogon by itself. In The Netherlands and in more than a few
other legal orders, legal and public discussion rages about the extent
of duties of care of banks toward clients dangerously spending money
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on shares, options etc. Thus Du Perron recently (2003) and promi-
nently defended the position that banks and like ﬁrms not just need to
inform clients about possible risks, but also are to refuse to perform
any really risky ﬁnancial operations possible disadvantageous to
clients, if such banks and like ﬁrms are to evade liability for all ensu-
ing clients’ losses.
In defence of this seemingly paternalist position he appealed to an
analogy with a well-established medical-legal rule, implying medical
doctors’ refusal, even upon explicit and well-informed patients’
request, to perform any medical operation (by surgery or otherwise)
without clear need but still carrying with it serious and irreversible
consequences. Such a duty of care may be self-evident in the case of a
medical doctor refusing to amputate limbs for no really good reason.
However, this duty of care is not exclusively related to the doctor-pa-
tient relationship. It is based upon a more general principle, prescrib-
ing not to act upon any fellow human beings’ wishes or commands if
their realisation may have damaging consequences for subjects
involved.
Interesting here is the question: why such paternalism? Reasons be-
hind it may explain its scope in legal contexts. More than a few will
probably say: loss of limbs is inﬁnitely more serious than loss of mon-
ey and that is why the underlying principle does not apply to share
investment and like situations.
Concerning the ‘loss of money-loss of limb’ analogy it is important
to note that there is not even any direct legal force in the original
analogon, as civil law dealing with relationships between private cli-
ents and banks has nothing to do with medical law, at least not in any
formal sense. Still the sense of the analogy, however strongly debat-
able, is immediately apparent. This serves to show again that the anal-
ogon cannot furnish any ground for the argument by analogy apart
from being a ‘source’ in a purely heuristic sense.
This example also brings to light one more time that analogy is
much more important in legal reasoning than explicit analogy, men-
tioned as such, may suggest. The life of the law and of legal reasoning
is comparing, looking for sometimes hidden similarities and differ-
ences.
Such differences are at the core of e contrario argument. To begin
with, it seems apposite to take e contrario argument to relate to what
Jansen called ‘inversed legal rules’, as such semblance of rule applica-
tion and its attendant logical invalidity is what the whole problem of e
contrario starts with. Or: how may it be that reasoning based on denial
of the antecedent, a fallacy not just in propositional logic, may be
acceptable after all? (Abduction is to be found here again, as [a! b]$
[b !  a], or: a contrario’s denying the antecedent is logically equiva-
lent to abduction’s aﬃrming the consequent, see on this Kaptein, 1999.)
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Again, the solution comes into sight as soon as the focus is shifted from
rules applied e contrario to wider contexts. Arguing that a rule does not
apply to a certain case, semblance of the contrary notwithstanding,
does not imply much by itself. However, such argumentation may be
supplemented by reasons why there are no other relevant legal grounds
for the legal consequence implied by the rule. Then something like the
following ensues, adequately covering both ‘classic’ and ‘modern’ e
contrario according to Jansen:
([p v q v r . . . v a] !b)
b! [p v q v r . . . v a]
 p &  q &  r & . . . &  a
__________________________
 b
(‘p’ etc. stand for legal conditions, ‘b’ for the legal consequence).
Which is of course sound logic. In casu and in general some or other
legal consequence, like liability to payment, may have different legal
grounds, like breach of contact or damage. Exclusion of one of such
grounds (for material and/or procedural reasons) does not exclude lia-
bility by itself. Only as soon as all possible grounds are excluded may
the legal consequence be denied. Or: e contrario in whatever form is
essentially related to argument purporting to non-applicability of legal
rules or grounds.
The original rule ‘applied e contrario’ recedes to backgrounds then.
Its non-applicability by itself may elicit no more than the question: so
what? Are there no other relevant grounds? Whether there are any
alternative grounds (suﬃcient conditions) has to be found out by ap-
peal to the whole body of relevant law. Again, as in the analogy argu-
ment, more or less complex reasoning appealing to underlying
principle may be appealed to in order to determine this body of rele-
vant law. In this important sense e contrario is not so much analogy’s
counterpart as well as relying as much on an (implicit) appeal to the
system and the underlying principles as analogy does (see also Kap-
tein, 1993).
Common to analogy and e contrario is their wide signiﬁcance, far
beyond their relatively limited ‘explicit’ application. Think of the medi-
cal doctor-bank analogy and its many more or less fruitful varieties in
formal and informal legal reasoning, turning around relevant versus
irrelevant similarities, to be decided upon by appeal to underlying
principle again. Or of the well-nigh standard denial of relevance of
possible legal grounds in order to ward oﬀ claims. This wide signiﬁ-
cance is of course deeply related to there being no such things as argu-
mentation by analogy or e contrario per se. Argumentation explicitly
called by such names is not really diﬀerent from standard legal argu-
mentation in terms of similarities and diﬀerences.
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Actually, the semblance of real argument hiding underlying factors
bearing the brunt of argumentation may be a more or less conscious
attempt to pia fraus. This disappearance trick may well have an age-
old background in legalistic styles of reasoning, in which upholding
the semblance of reliance on nothing but the law was deemed all-
important. Certainly in analogy cases, legalistic courts longing to stick
to the rules or to authoritative precedent, might simply not have wan-
ted to be honest about their expanding upon the law by simply and
explicitly stating the relevant background rule or principle. Then anal-
ogous reasoning ‘on the basis of a given legal rule’ is the natural way
out of course. Or pia fraus indeed. Thus concepts and uses of analogy
may well wane in less legalistic times and a cursory look at contempo-
rary adjudication may learn that explicit appeal to analogy is more or
less extinct indeed.
With e contrario things may be a bit different. E contrario appeals
to all relevant law as well. ‘E contrario application of a legal rule’ is a
different kind of pia fraus, then, rendering the impression that no -- by
deﬁnition non-legalistic -- argumentation on possible legal grounds to
be found in the system is apposite at all.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON JUSTIFICATION/SO MANY PROPER
ROLES LEFT FOR PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
Thus baby logic’s sledge hammer cracked surfaces subtly worked upon
by pragma-dialectics, (mercy-)killing ‘overworked’ concepts of analogy
and e contrario. What’s left for pragma-dialectics? All the rest. A logi-
cal approach to analogy and e contrario, or to well-nigh universal sim-
ilarity and difference argumentation in the law, clearly shows that the
good work is just to begin. The brunt of such argumentation is borne
by material principles, not just determining relevant similarities (anal-
ogy), but also determining what are relevant legal grounds in the end
(e contrario).
Of course the next and really important question is how to ﬁnd out
about and justify such background principles ‘unifying’ the law? For
example: is strict liability the main principle of contemporary tort law
in The Netherlands, or is there still pride of place for fault as a pri-
mary condition for liability? Or is it no longer plausible to take one of
these principles as the general starting point? Such complex questions
cannot simply be decided by appeal to simple logical analysis. Pragma-
dialectics may here return to the scene, in order to reasonably regi-
ment a well-nigh impenetrable mix of linguistic, historical, systematic,
teleological-evaluative etc. considerations. In fact, Dworkin’s (1986)
and others’ appeal to Rawlsian notions of reﬂective equilibrium
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(implying that justiﬁcation relies on the best total ﬁt of all relevant
general and particular factors, see Rawls, 1999 may make good use of
both logical standards of consistency and coherence and of regimenta-
tion by the rules of pragma-dialectics.
This brief analysis of analogy and e contrario may thus have shown
something of rather more general importance. There need be no com-
petition or conﬂict between pragma-dialectical and ‘traditional’ logical
approaches to legal reasoning. Just as no logic, however advanced, will
ever suﬃciently serve to regiment reasonable argument and conclusion,
so no plausible pragma-dialectics can do without the analytical powers
of logic, in order to eliminate pseudo-problems and determine possibly
underlying proper subjects of pragma-dialectics in the ﬁrst place.
Thus regarded, the scholarly contributions by Jansen and Kloos-
terhuis derive their importance not just from meticulous exposition
and illustration of so many interesting intricacies of legal reasoning (to
be studied with great proﬁt by anyone interested in legal reasoning),
but probably in the ﬁrst place from being essential intermediate stages
in ongoing critical discussion of legal reasoning. Their main subjects as
such may have fallen foul to Occam’s razor by now. Where there is no
problem, there need be no pragma-dialectics. But more than enough is
left (and not to be left to the jurists mentioned by Alchourro´n and
Bulygin), and coming up continuously in the life and times of the law.
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